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Abstract
Discussion of new axioms for set theory has often focussed on conceptions
of maximality, and how these might relate to the iterative conception of set. This
paper provides critical appraisal of how certain maximality axioms behave on
different conceptions of ontology concerning the iterative conception. In particu-
lar, we argue that forms of multiversism (the view that any universe of a certain
kind can be extended) and actualism (the view that there are universes that can-
not be extended in particular ways) face complementary problems. The latter
view is unable to use maximality axioms that make use of extensions, where the
former has to contend with the existence of extensions violating maximality ax-
ioms. An analysis of two kinds of multiversism, a Zermelian form and Skolemite
form, leads to the conclusion that the kind of maximality captured by an axiom
differs substantially according to background ontology.
Introduction
The philosophical and mathematical development of set theory and its philosophy
has been shaped by (at least) two different phenomena: paradox and independence.
The former afflicted early naive attempts to axiomatise a theory of reified collections,
and the latter remains a pervasive phenomenon in set-theoretic practice.
These two aspects have both led scholars to question whether or not there is a
single ‘absolute’ universe of sets. On the side of paradox, given any particular uni-
verse V , there are conditions φ(x) such that for every set y in V , either φ(y) or ¬φ(y),
yet there is no set of all objects satisfying φ(x). This is conceptually puzzling; given
the thought that all that one must do to characterise a set is provide its membership
conditions, such a condition φ(x) prima facie provides the resources to do just that.
Hellman expresses the problem as follows:
“Consider the predicate “is a set” or “is an ordinal”. In our overall seman-
tics, we naturally wish to assign an extension to such predicates. But, on
the standard platonist picture, such extensions would be proper classes.
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(Of course, they cannot be consistently treated as “sets” in the technical
sense; but they would be recognized as totalities of some sort, and this is
enough to generate the predicament just described.) It is worth attempt-
ing to develop an alternative picture.” ([Hellman, 1989], p55)
The predicament Hellman describes needs a little more explanation to make the
point clear. A natural thought concerning sets is that all that one need do in order
to define a set is provide a precise determination of an extension. Such a determina-
tion provides us with the membership conditions of the set to be defined. Linnebo
generalises this thought from the (merely first-order definable) conditions Hellman
considers, to (possibly arbitrary) instances of plural reference and quantification1:
“We can thus give a complete and precise characterization of the set that
xx would form if they did form a set. What more could be needed for
such a set to exist?” ([Linnebo, 2010], p146)
This kind of thought will, of course, be anathema to anyone who holds that there
is a definite height to the set-theoretic hierarchy.2 However, if one is moved by the
thought that all we need to do to produce a set is determine a precise extension, then
one way of avoiding this predicament is to allow that there is no absolute universe
of sets, but rather that any universe may be extended (in a manner we make precise
later). This would then allow the puzzling ‘proper classes’ of one universe to be sets
in an extended universe. Continuing with Hellman, he writes:
“Every structure...has a proper extension, both in the sense of inclusion
and in the sense that it, or some copy, occurs as a “member” of its proper
extensions (i.e. in the domain of the relevant membership relation).”
([Hellman, 1989], p59)
Thus, viewing the sequence of set-theoretic structures as unbounded and always
extendible provides the resources to have those things that satisfy φ(x) within some
universe form a legitimate set in an extended structure.3
The methods employed in showing the independence results have also moti-
vated the idea that any universe is extendible. The standard way of showing a sen-
tence ψ to be independent of ZFC is to construct a model of ZFC where ψ holds
(thereby showing that, if ZFC is consistent, then so is ZFC+ ψ), and also construct
a model where ¬ψ holds (thereby showing that ψ is not provable, if ZFC is consis-
tent). Often, these models are very natural: for example in a forcing construction,
if the first model is transitive and well-founded, then so is the extension. Thus, in
proving various independence results, we construct a vast ‘zoo’ of different epis-
temic4 set-theoretic possibilities. Some have taken this as evidence for the claim that
there is no ‘absolute’ inextensible universe of sets. Hamkins, for example, writes:
1See [Linnebo, 2014] for an excellent survey of the literature on plural reference and quantification.
Essentially, we introduce plural variables xx, yy, zz, etc. and quantifiers to range plurally over the rele-
vant domain, so “∃xxφ(xx)” may be read as “There are some things xx such that φ(xx)” (for a concrete
example, consider “There are some apples arranged in a circle.”).
2We provide discussion of the space of possible views in §1.3.
3In the work of Linnebo ([Linnebo, 2010] and [Linnebo, 2013] in particular), he refers to this principle
(rendered as concerned with pluralities and their modal properties) as ‘COLLAPSE’.
4We say epistemic possibility because on some conceptions of the ontology of set theory,CH has a truth
value at this world and mathematical objects exist necessarily, and hence CH has a particular truth value
out of necessity. On the widely held assumption that, even if such a view is true, we nonetheless do not
know the truth value of CH , there is still a modal space of a sort for ‘possible’ values CH might take,
where possibility involves consistency with what we currently know.
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“This abundance of set-theoretic possibilities poses a serious difficulty
for the universe view, for if one holds that there is a single absolute back-
ground concept of set, then one must explain or explain away as imagi-
nary all of the alternative universes that set theorists seem to have con-
structed. This seems a difficult task, for we have a robust experience in
those worlds, and they appear fully set theoretic to us.” ([Hamkins, 2012],
p418)
While the philosophical attitudes to the seriousness of this difficulty vary5 a mul-
tiversism about set theory offers an elegant interpretation of discourse involving
outer models and use of the symbol ‘V ’. Instead of having to view these possibilities
as illusory, we might instead take them to be indicative of modal relations between
many universes. The various set-theoretic constructions exhibiting independence
are then to be viewed as providing ways of moving among different universes ac-
cessible from one another.
Despite pervasive independence in set theory, there are those that hold that the
truth-values of many sentences are discoverable through the addition of well-motivated
additions to the axioms of ZFC. A champion of this cause was Go¨del, who wrote
concerning certain large cardinal axioms:
“These axioms show clearly, not only that the axiomatic system of set
theory as used today is incomplete, but also that it can be supplemented
without arbitrariness by new axioms which only unfold the content of
the concept of set explained above.” ([Go¨del, 1964], pp260-261)
Of course, it is one thing to discuss possible axiomatic extensions of ZFC, and
quite another to provide cogent philosophical arguments to persuade the philosophico-
mathematical community to accept these additions. While set theorists will likely
continue to work with and study multiple different incompatible axiom systems, the
possibility remains open to argue that certain axioms extending ZFCmay nonethe-
less be part of (or at least harmonise well with) our set concept, and thus that some
extension of ZFC should replace ZFC itself as our ‘canonical’ theory of sets.6 One
seemingly attractive line has been the study of principles that try to capture maxi-
mality in set theory.7 We want (so the thinking goes) the set-theoretic structures with
which we work to be as rich as possible, with as many and varied sets as possible. In
a footnote to the second version of his seminal paper on the Continuum Hypothesis,
Go¨del writes:
“On the other hand, from an axiom in some sense opposite to this one8,
the negation of Cantor’s conjecture could perhaps be derived. I am think-
ing of an axiom which (similar to Hilbert’s completeness axiom in ge-
ometry) would state some maximum property of the system of all sets,
5One might, for example, regard extension talk as primarily concerned with countable transitive mod-
els, as in [Koellner, 2013]. Hamkins has his own responses to this (and other) suggestions for providing
simulacra for discourse involving outer models and the symbol ‘V ’ (see [Hamkins, 2012]). We discuss
these issues in [Barton, S] and [Antos et al., S].
6Of course, whether there is such a theory (or family of theories) will depend somewhat on one’s
foundational tastes. We discuss this further in §3.
7Some scholars are circumspect about the possibility of extending ZFC with maximality princi-
ples harmonising with the concept of set. Feferman, for example, remarks that “...it is hard to see
how there could be any non-circular sharpening of the form that there as many such sets as possible.”
([Feferman et al., 2000], p411). Others are more positive, such as [Friedman, F]. The issue of whether
maximality is a good strategy to pursue is, for present purposes, irrelevant. Here we only wish to analyse
how maximality principles interact with ontology, and so shall assume that studying maximality in set
theory is both potentially fruitful and worthwhile.
8Go¨del has in mind here the axiom that every set is constructible, otherwise known as V = L.
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whereas axiom A [i.e. V = L] states a minimum property. Note that
only a maximum property would seem to harmonize with the concept of
set...” ([Go¨del, 1964], p262-263, footnote 23)
We see here Go¨del looking to intuitions concerning maximality in a search for
a resolution of CH . Since Go¨del’s paper, there have been several programmes that
attempt to combine notions of maximality with our concept of set in order to explore
the space of epistemic possibilities in searching for resolution of independence.9 This
paper explores philosophical issues surrounding the development of maximality
and how it relates to different varieties of multiversism. In particular, we will ar-
gue that the flavour of multiversism chosen affects the kind of maximality appealed
to. Our strategy is as follows:
After these initial remarks, we first (§1) lay out some conceptual preliminaries.
We briefly outline the iterative conception of set, and explain how it relates to debates
concerning actualism and multiversism in set theory. We present what some have re-
garded as a promising line of inquiry in the search for new axioms: the consideration
of maximality criteria. We then (§2) explain the use of extensions in formulating no-
tions of maximality, and note that different kinds of multiversism and actualism face
complementary problems; for the latter extensions are not available whereas the for-
mer has to contend with the fact that many universes exhibiting maximality have
extensions which fail to satisfy maximality axioms. Next (§3) we provide responses
on behalf of two different combinations of multiversism and actualism. We argue
that given this analysis, the kind of maximality captured by a particular axiom is
radically dependent upon the relevant philosophical backdrop. Finally (§4) we con-
clude that this is a feature of axiomatisation in set theory that ought to be borne in
mind when formulating and justifying new axioms for set theory. In addition, some
technical details are provided in an Appendix (§5).
1 Actualism, Multiversism, and the Iterative Concep-
tion
Before continuing further, we should be precise about the senses in which we will
be using the terms ‘Actualism’ and ‘Multiversism’, and lay down some conceptual
preliminaries.
1.1 The Iterative Conception of Set
Firstly, we shall be clear about the concept of set with which we work (the so called
‘iterative conception’ of set), especially as it is useful in providing explanation of dif-
ferent species of multiversism. Under the iterative conception, we iterate the power
set operation along the sequence of ordinals, starting with the empty set10 and taking
unions at limits. More formally, using transfinite recursion, we define ‘the’ iterative
hierarchy V , comprised of the stages Vα, as follows:
V0 = ∅.
Vα+1 = P(Vα), for successor ordinal (α+ 1).
9See, for example, [Koellner, 2010], [Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013], and [Welch, 2014].
10We set aside here the thorny philosophical and metamathematical issues concerning impure sets (i.e.
sets that contain non-sets as elements). See [McGee, 1997], [Menzel, 2014], and [Rumfitt, 2015] for some
discussion.
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Vλ =
⋃
β<λ Vβ , for limit λ.
V =
⋃
α∈On Vα.
The iterative conception has a number of pleasing features. This is not least be-
cause it motivates a restriction on the comprehension schema; in a particular uni-
verse we should not expect there to be a set of all the x such that φ(x) holds for any
condition whatsoever. In particular, conditions such as ‘x is an ordinal’, ‘x 6∈ x’, and
‘x is a set’ have sets satisfying them unboundedly in any iterative structure of the
above form, and so we should not expect there to be a set of all x such that φ(x)
within a universe.
A second reason that many have been attracted to the iterative conception is that
one can provide motivations for the axioms of ZFC based on iterative notions. Var-
ious attempts have been given in this regard, for example [Boolos, 1971]. The extent
to which these motivations are satisfactory is a controversial issue,11 and we will
not concern ourselves directly with the justification of ZFC on the basis of the iter-
ative conception. For now, we merely note that the iterative conception is at least
amenable to the provision of heuristic motivations for the ZFC axioms.
For our purposes, the key facet of working within the iterative conception of set
is that it provides a framework in which we can be more specific about the kinds of
multiversism we envisage. In particular, the distinction between issues of height (i.e.
the length of the iteration of the Vα) and width (i.e. what subsets exist at successor
stages) will be key for being precise about different kinds of multiversism.
1.2 Actualism and Multiversism
Once we are working within the iterative conception of set, we should be attentive
as to how (from a philosophical and conceptual perspective) the truth values of set-
theoretic sentences are settled. Since sets belong to stages obtained by iterating the
powerset operation through the ordinals, the truth-value of a set-theoretic statement
depends on two crucial parameters:
By questions of height we mean questions concerning what ordinals exist
to index the Vα.
By questions of width we mean questions concerning what subsets of Vα
are contained in Vα+1.
Once one has established what height a particular hierarchy has and the nature
of its powerset operation, then one will have settled all truth values for set-theoretic
statements within the structure. However, the extent to which one views questions
of height and width as receiving an actualist or multiversist answer will affect what
truth values one is prepared to ascribe to set-theoretic sentences.
We can come to an understanding of the differences between different kinds of
actualism and multiversism by examining attitudes concerning what is guaranteed
by the iterative conception. First, however, we require a remark concerning what
we hope to achieve with the iterative conception. There are some philosophers, a
good example being [Hamkins, 2012], who in virtue of a thoroughgoing belief in the
indeterminacy of any notion not absolute between any model of first-order ZFC,
hold that we do not even have a determinate concept of natural number or ordi-
nal. One might think then that such a view has no place for the iterative conception;
11See [Boolos, 1971] for a putative justification of ZFC, [Boolos, 1989] for an expression of self-doubt
about what iterativity guarantees, while [Parsons, 1977] worries about the interpretation of the iterative
conception, and [Paseau, 2007] analyses putative justifications.
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since there is no absolute concept of ordinal we cannot iterate along the ordinal num-
ber sequence to obtain the various candidates for our Vα. Such an argument would
be too quick, however, since any universe in Hamkins’ ontology believes itself to
have its own ‘iterative conception’ in which the sets reside (indeed, it is a theorem
of first-order ZFC that every set belongs to some Vα). For a Hamkinsian multi-
versist, however, the iterative conception has no absolute significance: It does not,
in addition to corresponding to a particular mathematical theorem, latch on to any
extra-mathematical facts (say concerning the nature of set-theoretic subject matter).
In this way, we may distinguish the mathematical content of the iterative conception
(i.e. the theorem that every set belongs to some Vα) from the philosophical content
(i.e. that the iterative conception tells us what the subject matter of set theory is).
Since we are interested in how the iterative conception can yield different ontological
pictures, we set aside views of Hamkins’ kind (despite its interest for the philosophy
of set theory). We will, therefore, assume for the rest of the paper that we have a de-
terminate concept of well-ordering, ordinal, and natural number, and that since we
begin with the empty set and iterate along the ordinal number sequence, whatever
is thereby defined is transitive and well-founded in some absolute sense (i.e. there
is determinate sense attaching to notions of transitivity, well-foundedness, and ordinal
independent of a particular model of first-order ZFC). Moreover, on the assump-
tion that we have a determinate conception of natural number, since Vω is absolute
between transitive well-founded models of ZFCwe should hold that Vω is the same
in every universe satisfying the iterative conception in the philosophical sense.
Assuming the iterative conception in the philosophical sense, it is what goes on
above Vω where most philosophical debate concerning actualism and multiversism
in set theory occurs. In particular, worries about what is guaranteed by our concep-
tions of the powerset operation and ordinal number sequence will result in different
combinations of actualism/multiversism. The time has come to be precise about the
different senses of multiversism and actualism we will examine:
By actualism with respect to height/width, we mean those views which
hold that there are universes of set theory which cannot be extended with
respect to height/width.
By multiversism with respect to height/width, we mean those views which
hold that any universe of set theory can be extended in the relevant di-
mension to a new universe of set theory.
This characterisation is essentially the same as the one provided in [Antos et al., 2015],
with one small difference, we opt for the term ‘multiversism’ rather than ‘potential-
ism’. The reason for this choice is to keep our philosophical discussion manageable;
potentialism refers to a wide variety of views, each of which has subtly different
philosophical commitments, and we wish to isolate very specific philosophical inter-
actions. To show this distinction, we exhibit two differences of this kind. (1.) A po-
tentialist in the style of [Linnebo, 2010] may well assert that there is just one universe
of sets, it is just that it is modally indefinite, whereas a multiversist position devel-
oped from the ideas of [Zermelo, 1930] (such as [Isaacson, 2011] or [Rumfitt, 2015]) is
likely to say that there is an unbounded sequence of universes extending each other
in height. This plays out in (2.) the ways proponents of each kind of view are likely
to ascribe truth values to set-theoretic sentences. To see this, suppose that there is a
Vα containing a measurable cardinal. A Zermelian is likely to say that this statement
is neither true nor false; there are perfectly good universes containing measurable
cardinals (e.g. Vα), and perfectly good universes lacking them (e.g. if κ is the least
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inaccessible, then Vκ is just such a universe).12 A Linnebo-style potentialist, however,
is likely to say that the statement “(∃x)Measurable(x)” is true; on Linnebo’s view the
set-theoretic quantifier (∃x) should be read as ♦(∃x) in a modalised set theory, and
“♦(∃x)Measurable(x)” does hold at every world.13 Since conceptions of truth in set
theory will be important for our arguments later, we choose to focus on multiversism,
despite the interesting questions surrounding potentialism more generally.
Though we have characterised the dimensions of height and width as separate,
they can often be intimately related. For example, there are some models that cannot
be extended in height to a ‘taller’ well-founded model without also being extended
in width. A good example here is the Shepherdson-Cohen minimal model of set
theory.14 This is a countable transitive model of the form Lα |= ZFC, where α is
the least such ordinal. Small additions of height to this model (even just two extra
L-levels) will necessarily add extra reals15, assuming that we continue to move to a
well-founded transitive model.
To see that this latter assumption of well-foundedness is necessary, we require
some additional terminology that will prove to be useful later. A top-extension of a
model M is a model N of which M is a subclass and in which M is a proper rank-
initial segment (though it need not be the case that M ∈ N).16 An end-extension
(or transitive extension) of a modelM is (by contrast) a model N which not only has
M as a submodel, but also adds no new sets to sets already present in M.17. Note
that there are top-extensions (constructed via a definable ultrapower) of countable
models of ZFC in which there is no least new ordinal.18 Recall, however, that for a
universe to satisfy the iterative conception in the philosophical sense, we required it to
be transitive and well-founded. We thus require that if one universe extends another,
in order to qualify as a universe it must be an end-extension. Thus, turning back to
the Shepherdson-Cohen model, we can put the point about the relation between its
height and width thus: it has no well-founded top-extensions.
We then obtain four views corresponding to each possible combination of actual-
ism/multiversism in height and width:19
By Radical Actualism we mean the view that there are universes of set the-
ory that cannot be extended in either height or width. The normal view
of this kind is Absolutism: the view that there is a single such universe.20
12Both [Isaacson, 2011] and [Rumfitt, 2015] express this sentiment with respect to large cardinals, but
also possibly when concerned with certain axioms that are ‘unbounded’ in their claims, for example the
Generalised Continuum Hypothesis. For example, if the GCH held up to some inaccessible κ but failed
above, it would be neither true not false.
13Here we assume that the Linnebo-style potentialist is an actualist in width, since if they were not, the
measurability of the relevant cardinal could be destroyed in a width extension. Given the focus on plural
logic in Linnebo’s work, this is a natural assumption, however it is one that could be modified and the
relevant form of potentialism (in both height and width) studied.
14See [Shepherdson, 1951], [Shepherdson, 1952], [Shepherdson, 1953], and [Cohen, 1963].
15To see this, note that in a model Lβ of V = L, first-order φ is true iff for some n, φ is Σn and
there exists a satisfaction predicate for Σn formulas which says that φ is true. These partial satisfaction
predicates range over Lβ+1 (i.e. are Lβ -definable) and thus this yields a satisfaction predicate for Lβ
which is first-order definable over Lβ+1 (and therefore belongs to Lβ+2). Since every set is definable in
the Shepherdson-Cohen minimal model (let it be denoted by ‘Lα’) this satisfaction predicate appears as a
real in Lα+2, and so any addition of height to another well-founded model of ZFC will necessarily add
reals.
16More formally: (i)M is a proper submodel ofN and (ii) whenever a ∈ N/M (i.e. a is in the difference
between the two domains of the two models) and b ∈M , then a has higher rank in N than b does in N.
17More formally: If a ∈N b ∈M then a ∈M .
18See Ch. 4, §4 of [Chang and Keisler, 1990] for details of the construction, and [Fuchs et al., S] for a
recent application.
19Again, this way of characterising the distinction largely mirrors that of [Antos et al., 2015].
20See [Go¨del, 1964] and [Welch, 2014] for views of this kind. Actualism has a variety of meanings in
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By Pure Width Multiversism we mean the view that there are universes of
set theory that cannot be extended in height, but that every universe can
be extended in width.21
By Zermelian Multiversism we mean the view that holds that there are
universes of set theory that can be extended with respect to height, but
cannot be extended with respect to width.22
By Skolemite Multiversism we mean the view that any universe of sets can
be extended with respect to both height and width.23
Our interest here will be with how these different views interact with ideas con-
cerning maximality. In the end we will argue that comparing the Zermelian and
the Skolemite with respect to certain recently proposed set-theoretic axioms reveals
that the content an axiom captures is substantially dependent upon the ontological
background within which one works.
One issue here, often discussed in the literature on Absolute Generality, is how
a multiversist of a particular flavour could interpret quantification over the whole of
their multiverse given that they hold that there is no ‘absolute’ set-like domain over
which they quantify. There are several options here. One might hold that despite
the fact that there is no absolute universe (a metaphysical question), this does not
preclude quantification over all domains (a semantic issue). Instead, one might (as in
[Glanzberg, 2004] and [Hellman, 2006]), take us to be always contextually restricted
and provide an explanation of how we should understand quantification. There are
still many options besides.24
Whatever the choice of account of quantification, the account of ‘V ’ will be schematic
for the Multiversist: On a given occasion of reference ‘V ’ operates like a free variable
that can be interpreted as referring to any universe of the required form, and (in the
case of an extending construction) the multiverse surrounding it. Later, exactly what
the ‘required form’ comes down to will be important. For the moment, we fix no-
tation for clarity. From now on we will use a caligraphric ‘V’ to denote universes
independent of ontology, and reserve the ‘normal’ symbol ‘V ’ for the Absolutist’s
universe. In our usage then, ‘V’ could denote a Skolemite universe just as much as it
could denote V , and we will be specific about any constraints we put on the use of
‘V’ within a particular argument.
A remark on terminology is important to clear up any misunderstanding. We
have chosen terms for the views that will form the focus of our analysis (namely
Zermelian and Skolemite Multiversism) for a number of reasons. The first is brevity,
we will introduce two characters; the Zermelian and the Skolemite25, each of which
subscribe to the relevant positions outlined above. Each view, as we argue below,
shares some features with the ideas of Zermelo and Skolem, however we do not
claim that Zermelo or Skolem themselves would assent to the views in their entirety.
the literature, for example [Linnebo, 2013] uses the term ‘actualist’ to refer to the position we call ‘Abso-
lutism’. This is tempered by the fact that in [Linnebo, 2013] (and other work, such as [Linnebo, 2010]),
Linnebo uses the term ‘actual world’ to refer to a particular stage in the construction of the (inherently po-
tential) hierarchy of sets. In order to avoid confusion, we emphasise the following: we are merely fixing
our usage of the term here.
21See here [Steel, 2014] and [Meadows, 2015]. The issues in [Steel, 2014], however, are somewhat subtle;
Steel chooses proper class models ofZFC as universes in articulating a view in which he advocates a shift
in foundations to a multiverse language.
22Pertinent examples here are [Zermelo, 1930], [Hellman, 1989], and [Isaacson, 2011].
23For examples of this sort of view, see [Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013].
24See [Rayo and Uzquiano, 2006] for a short overview of some options.
25The Zermelian will, to avoid ambiguity, be referred to using female pronouns, whilst the Skolemite
will be male.
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We wish to present arguments in philosophical exploration, not historical exegesis.
Nonetheless, some remarks concerning the genesis of the two views are salient in
order to isolate a particular theory of set-theoretic truth to which many multiversists
adhere.
Zermelian multiversism has its roots in the work of [Zermelo, 1930]. Central to
the motivations for the view are two metamathematical observations. First, that
our best second-order theory of sets ZFC2 is only quasi-categorical, in that any two
models of ZFC2 (with the full semantics) are either isomorphic or one is isomor-
phic to a proper initial segment of the other. This was seen by Zermelo26 as a failure
of our thought and language to pin down a single universe of sets, rather than an
unbounded sequence thereof. Second, it is through this unbounded sequence of uni-
verses that the problem of ‘proper classes’ is dissolved; any problematic ‘collection’
is simply a garden-variety set in a well-founded top-extension. So Zermelo writes:
“Scientific reactionaries and anti-mathematicians have so eagerly and lov-
ingly appealed to the ‘ultrafinite antinomies’ in their struggle against
set theory. But these are only apparent ‘contradictions’, and depend
solely on confusing set theory itself, which is not categorically deter-
mined by its axioms, with individual models representing it. What ap-
pears as an ‘ultrafinite non- or super-set’ in one model is, in the suc-
ceeding model, a perfectly good , valid set with both a cardinal number
and an ordinal type, and is itself a foundation stone for the construc-
tion of a new domain. To the unbounded series of Cantor ordinals there
corresponds a similarly unbounded double-series of essentially different
set-theoretic models, in each of which the whole classical theory is ex-
pressed.” ([Zermelo, 1930], p1233)
So we find Zermelo asserting that our thinking concerning sets, in terms of at-
tempting to provide a categorical second-order axiomatisation that pins down (up
to isomorphism) the objects of study, only succeeds in isolating varying universes
V , each of which is of the form (V V′κ ,∈, V V
′
κ+1) in some well-founded top-extension
V ′ (where κ is an inaccessible cardinal). The paradoxes are thereby avoided (so the
thinking goes27); any apparently problematic totality is a set in an extended universe.
Important for seeing the distinction between the Skolemite and Zermelian, is that for
the latter extensions of universes are all proper height extensions in that every universe
is a proper initial segment of some other universe (i.e. they do not disagree, for any
set x contained in both, on the identity ofP(x)). Indeed, it is essential to the view that
we have a determinate conception of the power set operation; the quasi-categoricity
theorem depends essentially on the use of the ‘full’ second-order semantics, and fails
when a Henkin interpretation equivalent to a two-sorted first-order formulation is
used.
The Skolemite puts no such weight on quasi-categoricity, and does not coun-
tenance the use of the full second-order semantics in interpreting second-order re-
sources. Rather, he sees many set-theoretic notions as essentially relative:
“Thus, axiomatizing set theory leads to a relativity of set-theoretic notions, and
this relativity is inseparably bound up with every thoroughgoing axiomatiza-
tion....on an axiomatic basis higher infinities exist only in a relative sense.”
([Skolem, 1922], p296, original emphasis)
26See, for later developments, [Hellman, 1989], [Isaacson, 2011], and [Rumfitt, F].
27There is a substantial question as to how much the Zermelian avoids the paradox, after all it seems
as though the sequence of universes is itself a proper class. Since our focus is on how maximality and
ontology interact, we set aside this difficult issue.
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There are several interpretations of Skolem’s arguments available.28 However,
of interest to us will be the idea that higher infinities are only relative, and how
this might relate to independence. One of the central techniques motivating the
Skolemite position that extensions are always available is forcing. This technique
provides us with a method of adding sets to models, and is essential in constructing
the relevant models for a wide variety of independence proofs.29 However, forcing
also enables drastic manipulation of the cardinal structure of models. In particular,
for any set x of cardinality κ in some universe V , assuming that width extensions are
always available, there is a forcing (known as the Le´vy Collapse) that collapses κ to
ω in the extension V[G].30 Thus, any set can be made countable, on the assumption
that we can always move to a width extension. This idea is taken up by Meadows:
“I would like to make the provocative suggestion that forcing is a kind of
natural revenge or dual to Cantor’s theorem: where Cantor gives us the
transfinite, forcing tears it down.” ([Meadows, 2015], p203)
As Meadows points out, though it appears that Cantor’s Theorem implies that
there are absolutely uncountable sets, given width extensions this is illusory. For,
given any particular infinite set x in a model, the cardinality of both x and P(x) can
be collapsed to the countable with a forcing construction (of course, the power set of
x in the original model will not be the same as the power set of x in the extension).
There are several differences between the thinking of Skolem and Meadows. In
particular, Skolem was motivated by the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorems, whereas
Meadows is motivated by the character of the independence phenomenon. Mead-
ows has in mind only width extensions, but the situation is made even more acute
if top-extensions are also available. Assuming that width extensions are available,
the cardinality of any set x within some universe V can be collapsed to ω. If we also
allow top-extensions, however, we can collapse the size of entire universes. For, given
a particular V , we can extend in height to some V ′ such that V ∈ V ′, and then use
the Le´vy Collapse over V ′ to move to a universe V ′[G] in which V is countable. The
Skolemite view that extensions are always available finds expression in the work of
Arrigoni and Friedman:
“Since the hyperuniverse, the collection of all countable transitive models
ofZFC, is closed under all possible universe-creation methods, one is led
to identifying the multiverse with it.” ([Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013],
p85)
This encapsulates the Skolemite position we have in mind. Though any Skolemite
universe V will take itself to have uncountable sets, since any universe can be consid-
ered to be a countable transitive model from a suitable perspective31, we can think of
talk about the multiverse as concerning all such models of ZFC. Of course, as noted
earlier, what we take to be ‘all’ such models will depend upon the background we
fix from the start.
One salient fact for distinguishing our Skolemite from the actual views of Skolem,
is the kind of upshot Skolem took from the hypothesis that any set could be made
countable.:
28For an excellent survey, see [Bays, 2014].
29We suppress the details of forcing for philosophical clarity. The interested reader is directed to
[Kunen, 2013].
30See [Kunen, 2013] and [Jech, 2002] for details.
31Of course, the same universe will also be uncountable from a different perspective e.g. itself.
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“The most important result above is that set-theoretic notions are rela-
tive....There are two reasons why I have not published anything about it
until now: first, I have in the meantime been occupied with other prob-
lems; second, I believed that it was so clear that axiomatization in terms
of sets was not a satisfactory ultimate foundation of mathematics that
mathematicians would, for the most part, not be very much concerned
with it. But in recent times I have seen to my surprise that so many
mathematicians think that these axioms of set theory provide the ideal
foundation for mathematics; therefore it seemed to me that the time had
come to publish a critique.” ([Skolem, 1922], p300-301)
There is a question here of whether or not Skolem was arguing against the use of
set theory as a foundation or trying to reject it tout court.32 For our purposes, how-
ever, we are interested in cases where set theory is foundational, and we are engaged
in trying to resolve set-theoretic independence. Why then, does our Skolemite not
repudiate set theory as understood through ZFC?
The answer to this question lies in how one construes set-theoretic practice. What
are we doing when we investigate set theory? One answer is that we investigate
the uncountable, in some absolute sense. After all, doesn’t Cantor’s Theorem teach
us that there are such sets? If one is moved by this picture of set theory, then the
Skolemite’s position does repudiate set theory as a discipline worthy of foundational
study.
However, this is not the only way of construing set-theoretic practice. Indeed,
it is unlikely to be the Skolemite’s view of set theory, given that he is immediately
committed to the non-existence of absolutely uncountable sets. Instead, he is likely
to construe set theory as an investigation of our combinatorial ways of thinking and
study of mathematical consistency. What different combinations of mathematical
objects (set-theoretically construed) are compossible? How can we construct differ-
ent mathematical models from one another? These are the kinds of questions the
Skolemite sees set theory as answering. Since the notion of uncountability imme-
diately becomes model-relative for the Skolemite, the study of uncountable sets is
one concerning how different set-theoretic properties interact within a model and
how they change when moving between models, rather than an examination of any
absolute notion of uncountability.
This view of set theory as conceptual investigation rather than the study of the
uncountable absolute has ramifications for the kind of theory of truth that the Skolemite
is likely to accept. In particular, he will see part of the study of set theory as what
holds relative to our set concept(s)33. As such his theory of truth will examine what
holds in all universes satisfying our concept(s) of set.
“Being confronted with a bewildering number of different options is a sit-
uation which we are familiar with not only in contemporary set theory.
A behavior which we naturally adopt in such a situation is the following:
we analyze what the possibilities are, choose among them those that un-
der justified criteria look better than others (hence could be privileged on
a priori grounds), and decide in favour of these.” ([Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013],
p86)
we then say that:
32See [Bays, 2014] for discussion and references.
33We say “concept(s)” rather than “concept”, as we remain neutral on the possibility of divergent con-
cepts of set for the Skolemite.
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“first-order properties which are true across preferred universes of the
hyperuniverse are true...”([Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013], p85)34
Thus, we have a characterisation of the Skolemite position on which what is true
is characterised as what holds in all models satisfying our concept(s) of set.
Despite their manifold differences, a parallel is now emerging between the Skolemite
and the Zermelian. Each wishes to assert that there are different, equally legitimate
set-theoretic universes, and no maximal such. Each universe in their ontology sat-
isfies the iterative conception in the philosophical sense, in that they hold there to
be absolute significance to the notion of well-ordering and ordinal, and their uni-
verses are obtained by iterating along the ordinals. Truth, for each, is to be under-
stood through analysing what holds across universes satisfying our set concept(s).35
The difference, however, is that they disagree on what our concept(s) of set guar-
antee(s) to be determinate, and hence on the nature of their respective multiverses.
The Zermelian holds that our conception of the powerset operation is determinate,
and that we should understand universes as models of ZFC2. Given a universe V ,
we can view V as of the form (V V′κ ,∈, V V
′
κ+1) (for κ strongly inaccessible) in some V ′
extending V in height. The Skolemite, on the other hand, regards the independence
phenomenon as indicative of indeterminacy in the powerset operation as well as
the ordinal number sequence. Hence, he has as universes various V that are count-
able in some extension V ′. While the ontology is radically different, the underlying
conception of truth is similar. Indeed, the conception of truth is the same for the
Absolutist. Truth for them is also construed as what holds across all universes sat-
isfying our concept of set. On their picture, however, since the powerset operation
and length of the ordinals is fully determinate, there is only one universe satisfying
the concept of set in the fullest sense. Truth is still truth across the multiverse, it is just
that it is a multiverse containing only one universe.36 This similarity in conceptions
of truth will turn out to be important when we come to assess characterisations of
maximality on each conception. We do not deny that there are other views of set-
theoretic truth. For example, [Linnebo, 2010] views set-theoretic truth as an essen-
tially modal phenomenon: an existential set-theoretic statement ∃xφ(x) is true just in
case ♦∃xφ(x) holds (and ∀xφ(x) in the case of universal generalisations).37 In this
paper, we simply restrict ourselves to multiversists who have the above conception
of set-theoretic truth (e.g. on the Zermelian side [Isaacson, 2011], [Rumfitt, 2015],
and [Antos et al., 2015], and on the Skolemite side [Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013]).
Again, we emphasise that though the views of Skolem and Zermelo have plausibly
inspired much work in the philosophy of set theory, it is unclear that either Skolem
or Zermelo would have assented to the conception of truth outlined here.38
34Though Arrigoni and Friedman refer to first-order properties here, in [Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013]
they explicitly consider them as consequences of higher-order axioms. We shall see some discussion of
these kinds of axioms in later sections.
35[Koellner, 2013] refers to this as “the multiverse conception of truth”. Both our Skolemite and Zermelian
would count as relative broad multiverse conceptions in his sense.
36[Koellner, 2013] refers to this view as the ‘Narrow Multiverse’: “the conception where the multiverse
consists of one element, namely V ”.
37The views in [Hellman, 1989] are very similar.
38Certainly Skolem seems to be arguing against the use of set theory as a foundation (though the exact
interpretation is unclear), and Zermelo is more focussed on providing an axiomatisation of structures
(and possibly also resolving paradox). Neither is clearly concerned with set-theoretic truth.
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1.3 Maximality
Given the characterisation of actualisms and multiversisms of various kinds above,
we might ask how we might go about resolving independence. One suggestion is
to examine features of our concept(s) of set in trying to formulate and justify new
axioms, and this is the approach we shall analyse here.39 A putative feature of our
concept(s) of set that has been put forward is maximality. The thought behind such a
view is that we should privilege universes which have certain maximality properties.
One might hold, say, that the ordinals should be closed under certain operations in
order for a universe to qualify as a bona fide universe of sets. Alternatively, one
might think that a universe should contain non-constructible reals in order to be
maximal. The idea has some precedent within the literature. Aside from Go¨del’s
earlier remark, we can find Drake saying:
“We look for justification for these axioms40 from the point of view of the
cumulative type structure, where we want to say that the collection of
levels, which is indexed by the ordinals, is a very rich structure with no
conceivable end.” ([Drake, 1974], p123)
Similar remarks are to be found in Wang:
“We believe that the collection of all ordinals is very ‘long’ and each
power set (of an infinite set) is very ‘thick’. Hence any axioms to such
effect are in accordance with our intuitive concept.” ([Wang, 1984], p553)
Of course, it is in the meaning of the terms “very long” and “very thick” where
the actualists and multiversists of various stripes will disagree with one another. For
an actualist in height, the term “very long” or “as far as possible” has a single uni-
vocal interpretation; the length of the ordinal number sequence. For the Skolemite
and Zermelian, on the other hand, there is no one univocal interpretation of what
“very long” or “as far as possible” means, rather it will correspond to certain fea-
tures of the sequence of ordinals within the particular hierarchies they countenance
as satisfying the relevant maximal conception of set. Similarly, the Skolemite (as well
as Meadows and Steel) will hold that there is no univocal interpretation of the term
“very thick”, rather this will correspond to the existence of certain kinds of subsets
available in any universe satisfying our maximal conception of set.
Maximality has received some attention, often because different scholars are more
(or less) optimistic (or pessimistic) about the prospects for such a strategy.41 While
this literature is interesting and important, our focus here is on how maximality and
ontology interact. We will therefore assume for the rest of the paper that maximality
represents a promising line of enquiry that we would like to capture axiomatically.
2 Complementary problems
In formulating and justifying different maximality axioms, species of actualism and
multiversism face complementary problems. The issue concerns the fact that often
talking about extensions is useful for making maximality claims about universes.
This is true with respect to both height and width extensions. Concerning well-
founded top-extensions and height maximality, the following axiom has been pro-
posed:
39Certainly [Go¨del, 1964] is optimistic about such a strategy. For a pessimistic voice, see [Maddy, 2011].
40Drake has in mind here reflection principles.
41For some salient discussion, see [Koellner, 2009], [Welch, 2014], [Friedman, F], and [Barton, 2016].
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Definition 1. [Friedman and Ternullo, S] M satisfies the extended reflec-
tion axiom42 (henceforth ‘ERA’) iff M has a well-founded top-extension
M′ satisfying ZFC such that for all first-order formulas φ and subclasses
A ⊆M belonging toM′, if φ(A) holds inM′ then φ(A∩VMα ) holds in VMβ
for some pair of ordinals α < β inM.
So, for a universe V to satisfy the ERA, it must have a ZFC-satisfying top-
extension V ′ such that if V ′ satisfies φ relative to the parameter A, then V already
contains a pair of ordinals α and β, with α < β, such that Vβ can see a level (namely
Vα) that reflects φ. Effectively, V can already see pairs of ordinals witnessing vari-
ous reflection axioms. The challenge for an actualist in height is that if she wishes
to assert that the ERA holds of some universe V , we have to be able to refer to top-
extensions of V . Of course this is hard to interpret for the height actualist, since there
are no top-extensions of their V (or V in the case of the Absolutitst). Thus, without
further interpretation and coding of top-extensions, the ERA will always come out
as trivially false.
Concerning width maximality, the following two axioms make use of ‘thicken-
ings’ of universes:
Definition 2. [Friedman, 2006] Let φ be a parameter-free first order sen-
tence.M satisfies the Inner Model Hypothesis (henceforth ‘IMH’) iff when-
ever φ holds in an inner model IM
∗
of an outer modelM∗ ofM, there is
an inner model IM ofM that also satisfies φ.
The IMH thus states that M has a high density of inner models, in the sense
that any sentence φ true in an inner model of an outer model of M is already true
in an inner model ofM. In this way,M has been maximised with respect to internal
consistency; it has been maximised with respect to what can be true in inner models,
given its initial structure.
There are a number of reasons to find the IMH interesting, not least because it
maximises the satisfaction of consistent sentences within structures internal to M.
The IMH is thus (if true) foundationally significant; it gives us an inner model for
any sentence model-theoretically compatible with the initial structure of a V (or V ),
and thus serves to ensure the existence of well-founded, proper-class-sized struc-
tures in which we can do mathematics. Moreover, the principle is relatively rich in
consequences, for example its normal formulation implies that the Singular Cardi-
nal Hypothesis holds. However, it is also interesting in that versions of the IMH
can have various anti-large cardinal properties (indeed some formulations of the
IMH prove that there are no inaccessibles in M), whilst having a relatively high
consistency strength (for instance the consistency of the IMH follows from the con-
sistency of a Woodin cardinal with an inaccessible above, whilst the principle itself
implies the existence of an inner model with measurable cardinals of arbitrarily large
Mitchell order).43. This is especially interesting as the IMH thus provides the possi-
bility of motivating an axiom that substantially reduces the ‘cap’44 on the height of
42Friedman and Ternullo in fact use the term ‘ordinal maximality ofM’ instead of ‘M satisfying the ex-
tended reflection axiom’ largely because [Friedman and Ternullo, S] is concerned with maximality criteria
on universes. As we are interested in axiom formulation, we opt for the term ‘extended reflection axiom’.
43See [Friedman, 2006] for the technical details.
44Talk of a ‘cap’ on the ordinals is somewhat difficult, as usually the term is taken to talk about proper-
ties of cardinals that cannot exist. Thus, the term ‘cap’ denotes a relationship between height and width,
rather than only height. For example, one can have countable models with a highly impoverished con-
ception of the power set operation that believe they contain supercompact cardinals. For this reason, even
assuming a definite power set operation (and hence fixing of this aspect of the cardinal properties of V ),
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the ordinals, which in turn would challenge the usual orthodoxy of obtaining deter-
minacy axioms through the use of large cardinals.45
Whence the problem then for the width actualist? If she wishes to use the IMH
as a new axiom about a universe V , she has to examine issues concerning extensions
of V . If they ascribe no meaning to claims concerning extensions, then the IMH is
utterly trivial. Under this analysis, everything true in an inner model of an outer
model of V is also true in an inner model of V , as either (i) the outer model is proper,
does not exist, and hence nothing is true in an inner model of that proper outer model
of V , or (ii) the outer model is V itself, and obviously anything true in an inner model
of V is true in an inner model of V . Thus, in this setting, the IMH fails to capture
its intended consequences (namely the existence of many inner models facilitated by
a rich powerset operation). In particular, under the present analysis, the Zermelian
will be unable to use the IMH to express any kind of width reflection.46
We have discussed how we might use extensions to directly formulate notions of
reflection, both with respect to width and height. It is interesting to note that it is pos-
sible to encapsulate the large cardinal consequences of reflection properties through
the use of objects known as sharps. We suppress technical details47 for readability.
The key fact is that through the consideration of an object (known as a sharp), we can
define the notion of a universe being generated by a sharp (or just ]-generated), when
it is the result of successive iterations of an ultrapower construction using the sharp.
A model’s being sharp-generated engenders some pleasant features. In particular, it
implies that any first-order property obtainable in a well-founded top-extension of
M (possibly with parameters) is already reflected to an initial segment of M.48 In
this way, we are able to coalesce many reflection principles into a single property of
a model. A natural axiom then would be:
Axiom 3. The Sharp Axiom. V is sharp-generated.
which would allow us to assert in one fell swoop that V satisfies many reflection
axioms (rather than having to assert them in a piecemeal fashion). Indeed, the ERA
is itself a consequence of The Sharp Axiom.49 Importantly, in order for a universe to
be generated by a sharp, it cannot contain the sharp from which it arises. Thus, such
an axiom is clearly problematic; claiming that V is sharp-generated depends upon
the existence of a sharp for V , which cannot be in V by design for a width actualist.
We then have the unwelcome result for those that might wish to use ]-generation
that the claim that V is sharp-generated comes out as trivially false; there simply is
no such sharp.50
So, it seems that for actualists of various stripes there are problems with formu-
lating certain maximality axioms. For certain recently proposed axioms of set theory,
it seems that we need extensions to formulate the axiom in a way that captures the
maximality properties we intend. Of course, this might make the relevant actualist
what one takes to be the cap will depend on other properties of V . If V = L (and there are no width exten-
sions of V ), the cap appears as early as 0]. Assuming AC, there cannot be a Reinhardt cardinal (i.e. there
is no non-trivial elementary j : V −→ V ). The point here is that the IMH pulls this cap all the way down
to one of the smallest kinds of large cardinal. For a detailed discussion, see [Arrigoni and Friedman, 2012].
45For a survey of this literature, see [Koellner, 2011].
46We shall see a method of responding to this worry in §3.
47We direct the reader interested in the details to [Friedman, F] and [Friedman and Honzik, 2016], and
provide the technical details in the Appendix.
48See [Friedman, F] and [Friedman and Honzik, 2016] for discussion.
49See [Friedman and Honzik, 2016] for the details of the proof.
50In the next section, we shall see how the width actualist (using work from [Antos et al., 2015]) can
respond to this difficulty.
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hesitant to examine such axioms. As we will show later, some actualists have the
possibility of coding these axioms, and thereby have the opportunity (should they
wish to take it) to examine multiple foundational programmes. However, as we shall
also see, in doing so the content of the axiom shifts according to ontological view.
This might lead one to think that there are no problems for the Skolemite. For, he
precisely has the extensions of the relevant dimension available in the way that the
actualist does not. Whence then the problem?
The difficulty concerns the fact that these axioms are meant to be capturing max-
imality properties, but for the axioms in question there will be universes extending
them that do not satisfy the axioms, despite containing more sets. Indeed, given any
universe V in the Skolemite’s ontology satisfying one of the above axioms, there
is a model in the Skolemite’s ontology extending V that violates exactly the same
axiom.51 So, for different multiversists, there are axioms that purport to capture
maximality that, if satisfied by some universe V , are violated in some universes con-
taining more sets than V . This is puzzling; the relevant axioms were meant to be
capturing maximality, but now there can be universes with more sets that violate the
axioms. There are thus complementary problems at play. An actualist in a particular
dimension will always have good reason to claim that a universe of the relevant kind
has captured a particular kind of maximality. After all, the relevant dimension can-
not be extended, and so has captured maximality of the relevant kind ‘absolutely’.
However, they will be unable to use extensions in formulating maximality axioms. A
multiversist, on the other hand, always has extensions available, but faces the chal-
lenge of explaining why their universes are maximal when, given some universe V
satisfying a maximality axiom Φ, there is a universe extending V which satisfies ¬Φ.
3 Different kinds of maximality
Before providing responses, we make a remark concerning the strategy of the rest of
the paper. We will now focus on a comparison of the Zermelian with the Skolemite.
The reason for this, as shall be made clear, is that the possibility of coding the con-
tent of width extensions is clearer when well-founded top-extensions are available,
and so we focus on views where this strategy is uncontroversial. Certainly it is an
interesting question how much sense of the ERA can be made by the Absolutist and
a multiversist of the Steel or Meadows variety. It is one, however, that we shall not
address here.
3.1 Saving the Skolemite: maximality as relational
The problem for the Skolemite is clear. Explain why a universe containing fewer
sets should be more maximal than one that contains more sets. In what sense is the
original universe maximal where the other is not?
A response can be obtained on behalf of the Skolemite by examining his concep-
tion of meaning and truth. Recall, for the Skolemite, that truth is determined by
what holds in all universes satisfying our concept of set. Thus, the use of the term
‘V ’ on his view is schematic; ‘V ’ can be taken to refer to any universe of the correct
form. He then has a quick response: if V ′ extends V but fails to satisfy the relevant
maximality axiom, then it also fails to fully satisfy our concept of set.
A simple example is instructive here. Suppose that we consider some V |= ZFC,
such that V = V V′κ in an extended V ′. One can ask a simplified version of the
51For the interested reader, we provide proof sketches in an Appendix.
16
problem. Given that V V
′
κ+1 is also a perfectly legitimate mathematical object for the
Skolemite, why not say that the Power Set Axiom is neither true nor false? After all,
V V
′
κ+1 contains more sets than V V
′
κ , and hence is a ‘more maximal’ model in this sense.
The answer, of course, is that V V
′
κ+1 violates our maximal concept of set in a bad
way; it is part of that concept that a universe be closed under the powerset operation.
Though V V
′
κ+1 is a perfectly legitimate mathematical object, it is not a universe in the
same sense as V = V V′κ . The interpretation of the term ‘V ’ to refer to V V
′
κ+1 in inter-
preting a set theorist would be a gross misunderstanding of the semantic content of
their utterances.
So it is with universes that extend others satisfying maximality criteria for the
Skolemite. On the assumption that he holds that the relevant axioms making use
of extensions are good for capturing maximality in our notion of set52, then the ex-
tended universes violating these axioms do not satisfy our concept of set. For the
Skolemite, for a universe to satisfy a (tutored) concept of set, it must do more than
merely be closed with respect to ZFC, it must have the kinds of closure properties
stipulated by the relevant maximality axioms.53
On the assumption that the Skolemite takes axioms involving extensions as good
characterisations of maximality, this response to the problem above has profound
consequences for how maximality axioms relate to our concept of set. For under
this analysis, maximality is not a property held by universes in isolation. Rather,
maximality is a property held by universes in virtue of closure properties specifiable
in terms of how they relate to other universes. The IMH says that a universe V has been
maximised with respect to internal consistency when we take ways of expanding V into
account. The ERA states that V can already see pairs of ordinals that reflect what is
realisable in some well-founded top-extension. The Sharp Axiom states that V is closed
under reflection properties yielded by the iteration of ultrapowers using an object
external to V (namely the required sharp). Thus, for the Skolemite, maximality in
our concept of set becomes a matter of how particular universes are perceived from
the perspective of expanded points of view. From expanded universes, maximal
universes appear saturated with satisfaction of particular kinds, and closed under
particular operations, even when the expansion is taken into account.
3.2 Aiding the Zermelian: maximality and infinitary proof
The problem for the Zermelian was markedly different. For her, the issue concerned
the fact that she wished to make use of width extensions in stating the Sharp Axiom
and the IMH , but did not have the extensions available. For this reason, the Sharp
Axiom and the IMH are usually formulated as concerned with countable models,
models which do not count as universes in the same sense as models of full ZFC2
(though they are perfectly legitimate models, they do not fully satisfy our set con-
cept; that necessitates (at least) ZFC2 satisfaction).
Recent developments (especially those given in [Antos et al., 2015]), however,
show how the content of the IMH and the Sharp Axiom can be coded over ar-
bitrary uncountable models (such as the Zermelian’s various universes) as long as
52This is a substantial assumption; the maximality axioms on offer are many and varied. We simply
wish to present the IMH and Sharp Axiom as case studies in how maximality, axiomatisation, and on-
tology interact.
53In the case of the ERA, IMH , and Sharp Axiom, a substantial technical difficulty is how to effec-
tively mesh these principles (versions of the IMH are inconsistent with the Sharp Axiom and the ERA).
The interested reader is directed to [Friedman, 2006], [Friedman and Honzik, 2016], and [Friedman, F] for
details and discussion.
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fairly mild top-extensions are available. Roughly speaking, it is possible (using an
infinitary logic) to code satisfaction in outer models of uncountable structures for the
Zermelian, and this facilitates formulation of the axioms over her various V .
Before we give some details, we provide an analogy to show the broad idea. Mar-
tin’s Axiom is a well-known proposed axiom, and is normally formulated as follows:
Axiom 4. Martin’s Axiom. Let κ be a cardinal such that κ < |P(ω)|. For
any partial order P in which all maximal antichains are countable (i.e. P
has the countable chain condition), and any family D of dense sets of P
such that |D| ≤ κ, we let MA(κ) be the claim that there is a filter F on P
such that for every D ∈ D, F ∩ D 6= ∅. Martin’s Axiom is then the claim
that ∀κ < |P(ω)|, MA(κ).
Effectively, Martin’s Axiom rendered in this form states that the universe has al-
ready been saturated by forcing of a certain kind.54 However, we could equivalently
formulate Martin’s Axiom as the following absoluteness principle:
Axiom 5. Absolute-MA. We say that V satisfies Absolute-MA iff whenever
V[G] is a generic extension of V by a partial order P with the countable
chain condition in V , and φ(x) is a Σ1(P(ω1)) formula (i.e. a first-order
formula containing only parameters from P(ω1)), if V[G] |= ∃xφ(x) then
there is a y in V such that φ(y).
The similarity between this version of Martin’s Axiom and the IMH is inter-
esting; both can be viewed as principles that assert that if something is true in an
extension, then it already holds in V . The IMH is just more general in that it per-
mits arbitrary extensions and arbitrary formulas (without parameters) in the form of
absoluteness.
Suppose then that the Zermelian was only aware of Absolute-MA and not Mar-
tin’s Axiom as usually stated. Supposing that she viewed it as a natural maximality
principle, could she meaningfully analyse the axiom for its truth or falsity despite its
apparent reference to extensions?
The answer is clearly “Yes!”. This is because (as will be familiar to specialists)
despite the fact that the Zermelian does not countenance the literal existence of the
extensions, she can nonetheless capture the notion of satisfaction in a set-generic forcing
extension using a formula (in an expanded language) that is first-order definable over
V . More specifically, by expanding our language with constants for all P-names in
V , and closing under the usual connectives and ∈V , she can define a relation P
(known as the forcing relation) in the expanded language such that: For p ∈ P, if p
were in some (‘ideal’, ‘non-existent’) P-generic G, and p P φ holds in V , then V[G]
would have to satisfy φwere it to exist. Moreover, if some ‘ideal’ V[G] were to satisfy
φ, then there is a q ∈ G ⊆ P such that q P φ.55 In this way, her various V have access
to the satisfaction relation of ‘ideal’ outer models. To be clear, from the Zermelian
perspective, all she is really doing here is talking about the relation P and various
q ∈ P in her model, it just so happens that this talk of P mimics what would be
true in extensions of V (were they to exist). The Zermelian can then reformulate
Absolute-MA as follows:
Axiom 6. Absolute-MAP . We say that V satisfies Absolute-MAP iff
whenever P ∈ V is a partial order with the countable chain condition in V ,
54The same goes for other forcing axioms such as the Proper Forcing Axiom.
55See [Kunen, 2013] for details.
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and φ(x) is a Σ1(P(ω1)) formula, if there is a p ∈ P such that p P ∃xφ(x),
then there is a y in V such that φ(y).
Thus, by coding satisfaction in outer models (without admitting their existence),
the Zermelian can express the content of Absolute-MA through Absolute-MAP .
What the Zermelian must do then, if she is to use the IMH and the Sharp Axiom to
express anything significant, is to code satisfaction in arbitrary outer models, not just
set-generic outer models.
Building on work of [Barwise, 1975], [Antos et al., 2015] using infinitary logic
show how to do just this. We suppress full technical details for clarity, but we can be
a little more precise. We first expand our language:
Definition 7. L V∈ is the language consisting of:
(i) A predicate V¯ to denote V .
(ii) A constant x¯ for every x ∈ V .
We can then define V-logic:
Definition 8. V-logic is a system in L V∈ , with consequence relation `V
that consists of the following axioms:
(i) x¯ ∈ V¯ for every x ∈ V .
(ii) Every atomic or negated atomic sentence of L∈ ∪ {x¯|x ∈ V} true in
V is an axiom of V-logic.
(iii) The usual axioms of first-order logic inL V∈ .
For a set of sentences T ⊆ LV∈, V-logic contains the following rules of
inference:
(a) Modus ponens: From T `V φ and T `V φ→ ψ infer T `V ψ.
(b) The Set-rule: From T `V φ(b¯) for all b ∈ a infer T `V ∀x ∈ a¯φ(x).
(c) The V-rule: From T `V φ(b¯) for all b ∈ V , infer T `V ∀x ∈ V¯φ(x).
Proofs in this logic are then (possibly infinite) well-founded trees, with root the
conclusion of the proof. Importantly, through the use of such a logic we can capture
the notion of satisfaction in an arbitrary outer model: Consistency of theories (obtained
by adding an extra predicate W¯ and the axiom that W¯ is an extension of V of the
desired kind) in this infinitary logic codes satisfaction in an arbitrary outer model,
just as having a p ∈ P such that p P φ coded satisfaction in a set-generic outer
model.56 Moreover, consistency in V-logic is first-order definable in the least model
of Kripke-Platek set theory containing V V
′
α = V (often denoted by ‘Hyp(V)’).57 We
can then formulate the IMH as:
Axiom 9. (IMH`V ) Suppose that φ is a first-order sentence. Let T be a
V-logic theory coding the existence of an outer model satisfying φ. Then
if T is consistent under `V , there is an inner model of V satisfying φ.
and the Sharp Axiom as:
56We defer detailed philosophical and technical consideration of V-logic and its applications to
[Antos et al., S].
57See [Barwise, 1975] or [Antos et al., S] for details.
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Axiom 10. The Sharp Axiom`V . The theory coding the claim that there is
an outer model of V in which V is sharp generated is consistent under
`V .58
We defer a detailed consideration of the philosophical and technical uses of V-
logic to different work, however the philosophical point is that we can formalise
what it means for a universe to satisfy either the IMH or Sharp Axiom in a fairly
mild well-founded top-extension of a universe. We are thus able to coherently state,
from the perspective of the Zermelian, what it means for a universe to satisfy these
axioms.59
Suppose then that one is a Zermelian who views one of the IMH or Sharp Ax-
iom as a good characterisation of maximality. What then is the content of these ax-
ioms? Again, they are particular ways of specifying closure properties of particular
universes. However, an important asymmetry with the position of the Skolemite is
highlighted. For under the present view, the IMH and Sharp Axiom are not a mat-
ter of how a universe V relates to other universes, but rather what is consistent in
an infinitary proof system relative to their initial structure. Thus, under this con-
ception, maximality becomes a structural feature of a universe V (i.e. that it permits
certain V-logic theories to be consistent), expressible in Hyp(V), rather than a re-
lational property of how V model-theoretically appears relative to other universes.
While both Skolemite and Zermelian, in keeping with their view of truth as what
holds across all universes satisfying our concept of set, will hold that maximality is a
kind of closure, exactly what is captured by this closure is very different in each case.
For the Skolemite, these maximality axioms fundamentally concern how a universe
appears relative to others in the multiverse. For the Zermelian, maximality is a mat-
ter of how a level of richness can be ensured using consistency in infinitary proof
systems.
4 Conclusion and a philosophical lesson
Before we conclude, we make a short remark concerning what can be learned from
the above analysis. Often in discussions of contemporary set theory, proposals for
new axioms (including maximality axioms), are discussed independent of philo-
sophical backdrop. Rather, particular formalisms are proposed and taken to express
a particular maximality feature. A good example here is the ongoing discussion of
whether V 6= L should count as a maximising property.60 The above discussion chal-
lenges this methodology. What we have seen here is that background philosophical
presuppositions concerning the nature of the subject matter of set theory fundamen-
tally alter the kind of maximality being expressed by a single axiom. In one case, the
IMH makes an assertion concerning higher-order relationships between universes,
and in the another the IMH concerns whether or not the structure of a universe is
sufficiently rich to accommodate certain properties expressed via a particular kind
58The issues are subtle here, as a formulation of full ]-generation depends upon a whole sequence of
iterations, and hence requires quantification over many V-logic theories. What we have actually formu-
lated here is an axiom of weak ]-generation. We direct the reader interested in the technical details of
formulating full ]-generation to [Friedman, F].
59A salient and interesting issue here concerns what resources an Absolutist (or certain kinds of Height
Actualist) requires to express these axioms: Thus far we have required the availability of certain top-
extensions in using Hyp(V). As it turns out, the question is intimately linked to what amount of Class
Comprehension they allow, see [Antos et al., S] for details.
60For discussion, see [Maddy, 1998] and [Maddy, 2011].
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of infinitary logic.61 Thus the precise content of axioms can differ, depending on the
ontological backdrop chosen. Further philosophical discussion of the justification of
new axioms should pay attention not just to the axiom in isolation, but rather how
the content of the axiom (and thus possibly its plausibility) can vary across different
conceptions of the ontology of set theory.
In sum, maximality in set theory is a tricky subject, not least because certain
proposals for new axioms involve the use of extensions in formulating notions of
maximality. This creates complementary problems for multiversists and actualists
of various kinds; the latter do not have the availability of extensions and the former
have to contend with the existence of extensions of ‘maximal’ universes failing to
satisfy the maximality criteria in question. An analysis of responses to these prob-
lems on behalf of the Skolemite and Zermelian reveals that the content of an axiom
can radically differ dependent upon ontological background. Future discussion of
the justification of new axioms should pay attention to this subtle feature of the se-
mantic content of set-theoretic discourse.
5 Appendix
The Appendix provides some details of technical material referred to in the text, but
too lengthy to be included in footnotes.
5.1 ]-generation
We first provide a small overview of the technical definitions of ]-generation (for
details, see [Friedman and Honzik, 2016] and [Friedman, F]):
Definition 11. A structure N = (N,U) is called a sharp with critical point
κ, a sharp, or just a ], iff:
1. N is a model ofZFC− (i.e. ZFCwith the power set axiom removed)
in which κ is the largest cardinal and is strongly inaccessible.
2. (N,U) is amenable (i.e. x ∩ U ∈ N for any x ∈ N ).
3. U is a normal measure on κ in (N,U).
4. N is iterable in the sense that all successive ultrapowers starting
with (N,U) are well-founded, providing a sequence of structures
(Ni, Ui) and corresponding Σ1-elementary iteration maps pii,j : Ni −→ Nj
where (N,U) = (N0, U0).
Letting κi = pi0,i(κ) denote the largest cardinal of the ith iterate Ni, we can
then use the existence of this sequence of structures (Ni, Ui) and corresponding Σ1-
elementary iteration maps pii,j : Ni −→ Nj to make the following definition:
Definition 12. [Friedman, F] A modelM = (M,∈) is sharp-generated (or
just ]-generated) iff there is a sharp (N,U) and an iterationN0 −→ N1 −→ N2...
such that M =
⋃
α∈OnM V
Nα
κα .
61It should be noted here, that the Skolemite can also express the IMH in terms of infinitary proof
systems, as he also has top-extensions available. Here, we should note that since each universe can be
made countable, the relevant completeness theorem holds, and so the two formulations become equiva-
lent (see [Barwise, 1975]). This is not so for the Zermelian, where the structures in question are absolutely
uncountable, and thus the relevant completeness theorem fails for Σ1 formulas.
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In other words, a model is sharp-generated iff it arises through collecting together
the V Niκi (i.e. each level indexed by the largest cardinal of the model with index i)
resulting from the iteration of a sharp through the ordinal height ofM.
5.2 Violating maximality in extensions
We now provide proof sketches of how certain maximality axioms can hold in some
Skolemite universe V , but also be violated in certain extensions of V .
Proposition 13. Let V satisfy the ERA. Then there is a V∗ extending V
such that V∗ does not satisfy the ERA.
Proof. Let V∗ be a rank-least well-founded top-extension of V such that
V∗ |= ZFC. Since V satisfies the ERA, we know that it must contain
unboundedly many V Vα such that V Vα |= ZFC. To see this, begin by not-
ing that V must have (by the ERA) a well-founded top-extension V ′ that
sees V as a V V′α |= ZFC, and hence V has a pair of ordinals β and γ with
β < γ such that V Vγ sees that V Vβ is a model of ZFC. However, now we
note that as V ′ can see two rank-initial models of ZFC (namely V and
V Vβ ), V has a pair of ordinals δ < ζ such that V Vζ sees that V Vδ sees two
rank-initial models of ZFC. Repeating this for any particular θ ∈ V , we
see that if V contains a θ-sequence of V Vα modelling ZFC, then it also
contains a (θ + 1)-sequence of V Vα modelling ZFC. Bearing in mind that
for any < Ord(V)-sequence of rank-initial ZFC models within V , V ′ can
see a ZFCmodel containing all of them (namely V), we know that V also
contains the relevant V Vα at limits, and we thus obtain the result that V
contains unboundedly many V Vα modelling ZFC. However, V∗ was cho-
sen to be a rank-least well-founded top-extension of V modelling ZFC,
and so Ord(V) + 1 bounds the Vα modelling ZFC in V∗ (and hence V∗
does not satisfy the ERA).
Proposition 14. Let V be sharp generated. Then there is a V∗ extending
V such that V∗ is not sharp generated.
Proof. Since the ERA is a consequence of sharp generation, this follows
from the previous proposition.
Proposition 15. Let V satisfy the IMH . Then there is a universe V∗ ex-
tending V such that V∗ does not satisfy the IMH .
Proof. Again, move to a V ′ in which V is countable and coded by some real
R. We then let V∗ be a model containing R that satisfies ZFC+“Every
real belongs to a countable transitive model of ZFC”. Since the IMH
implies that there are reals that are not in any countable transitive model,
V∗ violates the IMH .
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